Most of my published research focuses on a cluster of issues around incomplete preferences, unsharp or imprecise credences, and value incommensurability. In one sense of the word, two items are incommensurate if neither is better but they are also not precisely equally good. I’ve written a short introduction to incommensurability on its PhilPapers page.

In my book manuscript ‘Vagueness in Action’, I argue that these phenomena are all vagueness. I then defend a decision rule for vague preferences and credences, argue that this avoids some of their nasty consequences (so-called ‘value pumps’) and copes with some related puzzles, most importantly Warren Quinn’s Puzzle of the Self-Torturer and Spectrum Arguments for the intransitivity of ‘better than’. I’m happy to share drafts–please email me.

Global Normative Nihilism

In more straightforwardly metaethical terrain, I have a number of unpublished papers defending Global Normative Nihilism, which is moral error theory’s more aggressive sibling. Not only categorical/external but also hypothetical/internal resons claims are false. I argue that this view avoids (or embraces) ‘companions in guilt’ responses to queerness arguments for the moral error theory, and that it offers radical conceptual as well as metaphysical simplicity. It is a depressing (nihilistic!) view, but I argue that it won’t lead to a complete loss of motivation or subjective concern, as some have argued.

Normative and Practical Ethics

Despite nihilistic tendencies, I have lately also become more interested in questions in normative or practical ethics.

  • (Forthcoming) A paper on healthcare marketisation and the introduction of risk into the doctor-patient relationship. Promised to a Ratio special issue on risk.

  • (Forthcoming) ‘The Only Moral Flight is My Flight’, which defends carbon offsets against charges of injustice. Promised to an Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics special issue on intra- and interpersonal dilemmas in ethics and rational choice.