Unsharp Choices

Most of my research focuses on a cluster of issues around incomplete preferences, unsharp or imprecise credences, and value incommensurability. I am working on a book manuscript, tentatively titled 'Unsharp Choices', which argues that these all involve vagueness, and that seeing them as such solves a number of puzzles.

(Forthcoming) 'What does incommensurability tell us about agency?' in Value Incommensurability: Ethics, Risk, and Decision-Making, edited by Henrik Andersson and Anders Herlitz.

(2017) 'Incommensurability as Vagueness: a Burden-Shifting Argument', Theoria 83: 341–363. doi: 10.1111/theo.12129
(preprint) (journal page) (PhilPapers)

(2016) 'Tenenbaum and Raffaman on Vague Projects, the Self-Torturer, and the Sorites', in Ethics Vol. 126, No. 2, pp. 474–488. doi:10.1086/683533.
(open-access copy) (journal page)

(2014) 'Heaps and Chains: is the Chaining Argument for Parity a Sorites?', Ethics Vol. 124, No. 3, pp. 557–571. doi: 10.1086/674844
(open-access copy) (journal page)

(2014) 'Borderline Cases and the Collapsing Principle', Utilitas volume 26, issue 01, pp. 51–60. doi:10.1017/S095382081300023X
(open-access copy) (journal page)

Other Publications

(2019) 'Probabilistic Promotion and Ability', Ergo vol. 6, no. 34. doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0006.034
(open-access at journal)

(2019) 'Can Streumer simply avoid Supervenience?', Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy vol. 16, no. 3 (2019). doi:10.26556/jesp.v16i3.508
(open-access at journal)

(2018) Review of David Sobel’s From Valuing to Value, Analysis, Volume 78, Issue 3, pp. 583–586. doi:10.1093/analys/any045.
(open-access at journal)